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Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets
ABSTRACT
The concept of transactions costs used by Coase in "The Nature of the Firm"
is applied to the internal labor market of an organization. Under joint
production it is shown that the number of transaction—specific prices neces-
sary to decentralize labor allocations rises geometrically with the size of
the work force. Complexity of calculation and costs of implementation
constrains the possibilities •for internal decentralization through a price
mechanism and substitutes a more authoritarian system of allocation instead.
These same issues of complexity and implementation costs limit the useful-
ness of agency theory as a conceptual framework for this problem. The
analysis suggests that an internal labor market must be viewed in a more
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Coase's first lecture reveals a surprising aversion toward mathe-
matics. Curious, coming from one of the few economists who has a THEOREM
named after him. In fact an easy case can be made that Ronald is respon-
sible for two theorems, a lemma, and, according to some, an identity. THE
Coase Theorem is at this point well beyond further discussion. The Second
Theorem is the remarkable one on the time—consistent, subgame perfect equi-
librium for a durable goods monopolist—-the poor soul who is forced to
either destroy some property or else act as a perfect competitor because it
is impossible to commit now to actions that are not credible in the future
except when monopoly power remains unexploited (Coase [1972]). The Lemma is
not as well known, but should be. It is stated in some remarkable work with
Fowler in 1935, the first known attempt to fit an intertemporal arbitrage
condition, an Euler equation, to real data. Coase and Fowler [1935] were
dubious about the rationality of Cobweb theory as an explanation for the pig
cycle. Raising pigs happens to be a very specialized business. Breeders
sell young pigs to feeders, who in turn sell them in the slaughter market
after they have grown to the proper size. Coase and Fowler reasoned
that easy money could be made in the first—stage transactions unless the
I am indebted to Bengt Holmstrom, Edward Lazear, Oliver Williamson and the
referee for comments and criticism of an initial draft and to the National
Science Foundation for research support.2
average market prices paid for young pigs reflected expectations about the
price of pork some nine months later, the period in the 1930s (now it is six
months) over which animals were held prior to slaughter, and they verified
the hypothesis empirically in British data. The work is instantly reoognized
today as a version of the rational expectations hypothesis and acknowledged
as such by Muth in his important paper on the subject.
Though many economists would sell their souls for a theorem, if not
an inequality attached to their name, I suspect that Ronald would rather be
identified with a LAW. This is not the place to speculate on why Laws in
economics are so few, but they seem conspicuous by their scarcity. The law
of demand is now a theorem about the Slutsky matrix, and most of the laws
that are associated with specific name haven't fared well. Stigler's law
was replaced, for a time, by Laffer's curve, the growth of Los Angeles
annihilated Zipf's law, and the takeover and Japanese competition have not
been kind to Gibrat's law. Walras and Engel have done better, but then only
one of them concerns an empirical phenomenon.I hope Coase claims his law
from his renewed interest in the subject at hand.
Many studies have calculated a four year average half-life of cita-
tions of articles in economics. Citations to the "The Nature of the Firm"
show not only remarkable longevity but also an exceedingly rare decreasing
hazard of mortality with age. No doubt this is due to the fundamental
questions posed by the work and to the various meanings that can be attached
to it.In reading it again I was struck by parallels with the literature of
that time on the role of the price system in "spontaneously coordinating"
economic activities, to use Hayek's felicitous expression, as compared to
the heavy and inefficient hand of coordination through central planning.
Coase takes the invisible hand as his point of departure and inquires into3
thelimits of market transactions as a coordinating mechanism. If markets
are ideal coordinators, why should we ever observe any nonsporitarteous,
nonrnarket coordination, as we appear to do within firms?
Coase argues that firms exist because some transactions internal to
firms are less costly than similar transactions carried out in markets. The
limits of the firm depend on cost comparisons at these margins.
Ultimately, these limits are determined by market competition among
firms, including the market for corporate control. "Central planning"
within firms is disciplined by competition them, so long as resources are
free to move to their highest valued uses. As Alchian (1950) argued, firms
making superior decisions gain control of more resources at the expense of
the less efficient. It is the central role of competition and concern with
more aggregate questions of supply and demand that probably accounts f or why
much of economic theory dispenses with the notion of the firm altogether;
for example, general equilibrium theory uses only a very abstract notion of
technology.
In what follows, I apply the theme of "The Nature of the Firm" to
labor markets. Relation—specific exchange embodies the empirical content of
transactions cost in modern industrial organization. Firm—specific human
capital is a closely related concept. Section II reviews recent research
showing that the costs of matching workers to firms and of assembling a team
of workers are major components of these investments. Section III analyzes
the nature of a decentralized market mechanism under these circumstances and
shows that efficient allocations require a large number of transaction-
specific prices, the costs and complexity of calculation and implementation
make market decentralization impractical. The theme of complexity and a
plethora of prices is pursued in section IV, in the context of principal andLI
agent theory. The emphasis here is on incentive rather than selection and
allocation problems. Nonetheless, the main results so far share the same
conceptual difficulty of excessive complexity and implementation costs. A
broader approach which combines incentive, selection and allocation problems
is stated in section V, within the context of the firm's personnel manage-
ment policy of its internal labor market. Here changing selection and
assignments of workers to positions over the work—life cycle interacts with
performance incentives and worker capabilities. Conclusions appear in
section Vi.
II. TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND SPECIFIC CAPITAL
Coase did not define the empirical content of transactions costs in
"The Nature of the Firm," nor tell us how to recognize them when we see
them.Much progress has been made since then, especially by Becker [196LI]
and Williamson [1975], in identifying transactions costs with firm specific
human and nonhuman capital. Shared investment costs requires sharing later
returns and can lead to ex—post contract enforcement problems due to ineffi-
cient, opportunistic behavior. Several empirical observations in the labor
market are consistent with the idea of specific human capital, especially
the long—term attachments between workers and firms. The longest job of a
typical white male worker persists for twenty—five years (Hall [1982]). Top
level executives in major U.S. corporations are mostly "home grown," having
spent thirty years or more with their firms in lesser positions before
breaking into the top echelons (Murphy £19824]).Is is also otherwise dif-
ficult to understand the patterns of layoffs and employment variability
among workers. Workers who have higher wages and greater job and firm-
specific skills are less likely to be laid off.5
So far, however, the magnitude of firm—specific human capital has
eluded precise econometric measurement. The latest investigations of this
problem by Altonji and Shakatko [19814]; Abraham and Farber [1987], Marshall
and Zarkin [1985], and Topel [1987] suggest that most of the observed ef-
fects of firm—specific experience on earnings are due to selection. Highly
paid employees have greater tenure with their firms but were also highly
paid when first hired. These workers remain with their firms longer and
exhibit greater firmspecific experience because their earnings were larger
there to begin with. They were better matched to their jobs in the first
instance. Workers who were not matched so well earned less and left their
firm in search of greener pastures, thus exhibiting less firm—specific
experience. When these selection effects are controlled statistically, it
is found that the "true" firm specific experience effect on earnings is
about the same as the general labor market experience effect, that is, the
same as the general tendency for earnings to rise with age. Now match—
specific effects certainly are a type of firm—specific capital, hut of a
slightly different nature than in the literature that derives inspiration
from "The Nature of the Firm."
The measurement of physical capital-asset-specificity is perhaps
easier, especially as it pertains to vertical integration. Joskow's [1987]
recent study of the contractual relationships between electric utilities and
coal suppliers is a good case in point. Nonetheless, there are ambiguities
in defining the limits of the firm when asset specificities and transport
cost—based rents are regulated by long—term contracts. Are these to be
classified as market transactions, transactions internal to the extended
family of the firm or what? Klein, Crawford and Alchian [1981] analyze many6
examples where asset specificities are internalized by ownership. My favor-
ite was the Hawaiian resort that purchased the adjacent golf course to avoid
ex post bargaining costs and opportunism. However, that kind of reasoning
won't go very far in accounting for why Yale University is vertically in-
tegrated with a splendid golf course (perhaps it is meant as an extra bar-
rier for making tenure among golfers).
As pointed out by Shavell [1979], asset ownership dominates rental
when the user's actions can substantially affect its resale or transfer
value. Ownership internalizes conflicts of interest over maintenance and
reckless use of equipment, and surely is the most important reason why most
capital goods are owned outright by the firms that employ them. Some of the
remaining cases of capital leasing can be 'understood on tax grounds (Scholes
and Wolfson [1986]), but several defy analysis. Rentals of capital services
are common in commercial real estate transactions, and greater tax advan-
tages to wealthy individuals compared to businesses probably account for
some of this, at least historically. Yet no such consideration applies to
the separate ownership of sites and structures. Consider that the World
Trade Center sits on rented land. Since those buildings are securely an-
chored to the bed rock below that part of Manhattan, it is difficult to
conceive of more asset specificity than this. There is even more asset
specificity in this than in Coase's observations on the contractual rela-
tions between GM and A.O. Smith in his third lecture. True, the lease on
the land is very long term, running to 99 years. Still, the potential
difficulties of renegotiation several years before the lease expires are
well illustrated by what has happened in Hong Kong in recent times. These
are more than rent-splitting and pure distribution problems, because the
building owner can take actions, such as lack of maintenance, that directly7
affects the value of the site. Common ownership of both site and structure
would eliminate this problem. Why isn't it always observed?
III. LIMITS OF LABOR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION
Contractual difficulties arising from shared ownership of assets is
an important case of a more general problem of devising decentralized pric-
ing mechanisms under joint production. If there were no scale economies,
transport costs nor economies of joint production, it is difficult to im-
agine why complete decentralization of labor markets would fail to achieve
efficient allocations. Most workers would be, in some sense, self—employed.
Coase provides a good example by reference to Stigler's [1951] discussion of
British gun manufacture in the 18th century. Specialization and division of
labor in allied trades was virtually complete when guns were manufactured on
a small scale in a skilled craft system. Craftsmen were specialized by
function: barrels, trigger mechanisms, stocks, sights, and so on. Others
specialized in assembly, purchasing inputs from these specialists, producing
the finished product and distributing it to customers. Most of these spe-
cialized transactions were carried out by market contracts, all within
shouting distance of each other in a small area of Birmingham. Alfred
Marshall [1930] analyzed this kind of system in his theory of external
economies and locational concentration of specialized industries. Whitney's
attempt to manufacture standardized guns on a large scale was unsuccessful,
but his effort to achieve standardization and interchangeable parts altered
gun manufacture forever. Gun—making was thereafter vertically integrated
arid many of the transactions that had previously been organized through the
marketplace were coordinated by more authoritarian methods within firms.8
Imagine how markets would have to be organized under these circum-
stances. A worker would own (or rent) a place in the assembly line, having
purchased the rights from its previous owner. Its economic value would
reside in the residual rights of contract, the profit gotten from purchas-
ing intermediate products from adjacent upstream sellers and reselling the
value—added units to adjacent downstream buyers. A decentralized contract-
ing system confined to single quarters would be very difficult to manage
because of the team aspects of the situation and the complicated intercon-
nections of property rights they imply. Downstream workers, obliged to buy
from an adjacent seller due to proximity and smaller transport costs, become
very interested in the identity of that seller, because the volumeand
quality of work at each point affects the value of property rightsof all
others to whom it connects.
An exceedingly complicated contractual system, usually requiring
side—payments among participants in the organization, is necessaryto
achieve efficiency in these circumstances. The number of prices necessary
to manage it can be very large indeed. However, a simpler mechanism maybe
available: one person retains all residual rights, assembles the appropriate
team of workers on a contractual basis, assigns them to their most produc-
tive positions in the firm, and monitors their work. The terms of these
contracts must specify standards for the quality and quantity of work, as
well as employment conditions regarding working hours and regularity of
employment, these nonprice dimensions of contracts being necessary to inter-
nalize technological dependencies among workers. Financial terms of con-
tracts are constrained by competition for workers in the labor market.
Concentrating control in this way and establishing a wage system may be a
less complicated way of achieving efficiency than designing and monitoring9
an elaborate accounting system and calculating the individualized prices
required by a decentralized internal transfer—pricing mechanism.
To illustrate the nature of the calculations needed, consider an
organization where joint production entails complementarities of time spent
with co—workers. Let x1 represent the output of worker i and lett denote
the time that i spends with j (the time that i spends alone is t1•). There
are n worker and the output of worker i is
(1) x. =F'(t.1,t.2,...,t.)for I =1,2,...,n.
The problem is to find an allocation of time (t1} that maximizes total
output in the organization, the sum of the x1's, subject to two kinds of
constraints. First, the time allocation of each worker must exhaust total
time worked. Ignoring choice of total hours worked and normalizing it to




In addition, the time that worker i desires to spend with worker j must
equal the time that workerdesires to spend with worker 1: there are (n2-
n)/2 constraints of the form
(3) t.. =ti.,
for i *j.
First—order conditions for the efficient time allocation take the
following form:
For t.. we require
1].10
() F(t.1,t.2,...,t.) A., for i =
whereA. is the multiplier on constraint (2) for worker 1. The equality is
binding when t.. > 0, has the interpretation of the shadow price of
i's time. For t. .andt.. we need: -
(5) F(t.1,t.2,...,t.)
A. +.. for=
F(t.t. ,...,t.. )A.+..forI = 1 31,32 jn j 31
—
withstrict equality whenever t > 0. Here is the multiplier asso-
ciated with constraint (3) and .= -8,j.Since A1 is the marginal product
of own time, () and (5) together imply that if it is efficient for i and j
to work together Ct. .=t..> 0) then
(6) F'/t..+ F3/t..=A.+A. F1/t. .+
13 31 1 3 11 33
Equation (6) resembles the condition for efficient joint production of a
"public good." The right hand side is the marginal cost of joint production
for the pair of workers, the output foregone if both had spent their time
alone rather than together. The left hand side is the marginal value of
joint production, the sum of the incremental products of working together.
Conditions (4) —(6)have an important implication, that the decen-
tralized price system that implements the efficient program is very compli-
cated. The fact that (5) and (6) refer to pairs of .iorkers means that the
marginal product of a given worker"s time is not equated across all workers
to whom he is assigned. The time-price worker i spends with another worker11
k is +8and 8 *B.unless workers j and k are in some sense identi—
1
calto each other. Hence a pricing system would have to use different
prices for time charged in each possible pairing. This point is related to
the problem of establishing prices in network systems such as landing rights
at airports and other assignment problems (Koopmans and Beckmann [1957]).
Let w.. be the unit price that worker i charges workerper unit
time, with w. =—w..,so w.. is the unit price j must pay to I if w.is
positive (or the price that j charges I per unit time ifw is negative)
Taking output as numeraire, the decentralized solution is achieved by let—
ting each worker act as a residual income recipient, selling own output to
the owner of the firm at price 1.0 and charging each co—workerw per unit
of time spent with each. Worker i chooses{t} to maximize
(7) F'(tiit2j••tni) +
1*3
subjectto (2). The first order condition is
(8) —aF1/at. .,+aF1/at.+w.. 0, for I *j. 11 13 13
Thisresults in the efficient solution so long as8 = that is, so
long as the proper price of time (possibly so large that I anddo not work
together) is found for each pair. Since there are (n2— n)/2 independent
shadow values of time, the number of prices necessary to achieve efficiency
increases with the square of the number of workers. It would increase even
more if triples and higher orders of joint production were considered.
Moreover, to calculate and implement this solution requires full knowledge12
of the underlying technology and productivity of team members in the first
place.
If that knowledge is possessed by a specialist, an authoritarian
system whereby the specialist—manager allocates workers to each other and
monitors their activities may be less expensive to implement than an inter-
nal price system. Errors in prices can be more costly than errors in quan-
titles (Weitzman [19714]). For example, complernentarities may be so large
that the optimal ta's are easy to calculate, whereas small errors in set-
ting the prices w..'s could lead to serious misallocations of time among
individual workers. Furthermore, agreeing on a price can be time-consuming
and divert time and energy away from production even when it is clear that
trade should take place. For if exact valuations are private information
then traders have incentives to argue over the distribution of gains from
trade. Of course elements of these very same problems arise in interfirm as
well as intrafirm transactions. Nevertheless, direct team interactions are
far less important in interfirm transactions and they are more easily regu-
lated by contractural arrangements, the monitoring of output quality, and by
market competition among alternative sources of supply. The close—quarter
interactions of workers and the transport cost savings they imply limit the
degree of substitution and competition from outside alternatives. External
labor market competition disciplines a firm's internal labor market with
respect to overall wages and working conditions, but leaves some slack at
the micro—transactions level of precise worker interactions.
Such a system is observed in our own backyard, in the organization
of the education industry. In modern educational systems, the price mechan
ism is used largely to allocate students and teachers among schools, and
even then it is incompletely used for this purpose: nonprice considerations13
play an important role in these allocations. It is used hardly at all to
allocate students to courses and to teachers within schools. Gaining admis-
sion and paying tuition entitles a student to fish among a broad range of
courses. Committees and other collective bodies determine requirements,
course sequencing, class size and other matters of internal allocations.
Transfer prices are seldom used.
It was not always so. The original universities were collections of
individual teacher—entrepreneurs, and fees were determined by bargaining and
haggling with individual students (Rashdall [1895]). As universities emer-
ged out of these crude beginnings, two-part pricing schemes were adopted.
Students paid lump-sum tuition charges to enter and a marginal payment to
specific teachers in courses of their choice. This is the system that Adam
Smith advocated, on incentive and agency grounds. But as far as one can
tell, all teachers in the same university charged the same unit prices,
whereas efficient allocations of students to teachers almost certainly
require different prices for different teachers, as well as price differen-
tials among students within each course. Two—part pricing was entirely
abandoned in the twentieth century and replaced with one-part salary and
tuition pricing, probably because the bundling and information aspects of
modern formal education made it cost effective to ration by queues, prereq-
uisites and requirements rather than by individually tailored prices (see
Rosen [1987] for further elaboration).
IV. DECENTRALIZATION AND AGENCY
If the number of prices necessary to decentralize a complex interac-
tive organization increases multiplicatively with size, then the amount and
cost of monitoring required to achieve efficiency also must grow with size.114
Informationbecomes garbled as it passes through longer chains, and inforrna—
tion channels become congested as chains-of-command lengthen (Williamson
[1967]). It is the balancing of joint—production and scale economies
against increasing costs of control associated with nonmarket transactions
costs that determines Organization size in traditional theory.
The avoidance of monitoring cost preoccupies the modern literature
on agency theory. The main question posed is:Can penalty and reward
systems be found that result in self—enforcing contracts? If so then inter-
nal decentralization may be efficient and the size of firms could be very
large indeed. A fundamental result proves that multipart pricing is neces-
sary to induce an agent to behave in the interests of the principal. This
is the bonding scheme analyzed by Becker and Stigler [19714]. The idea is
straightforward and rests on the proposition that an agent behaves honestly
if confronted by a scheme that makes such behavior consistent with self
interest. Evidently the scheme must either reward good behavior or punish
bad behavior (malfeasance).
Considerations of labor market equilibrium dictate the penalty mode
rather than the reward mode. For if the agent is given extra monetary
rewards for good behavior, the expected utility from holding the job exceeds
that available from alternatives and the supply of job applicants exceeds
the number of available positions. On the other hand, if a worker posts
bond money "up front" and the bond can be seized by the firm if malfeasance
occurs., honest behavior is elicited by paying a market wage premium equiv-
alent to interest on the bond, with the bond itself returned at the end of
the contract. This bond—interest—principle scheme equalizes workers' ex-
pected returns among jobs and achieves job-market clearing. An important
modification of the argument allows workers to post bond by investing in the15
firm; by working at a wage less than marginal product in the early years of
a career, and receiving the return at older ages in the form of wage pay-
ments in excess of productivity (Lazear [1979]). Another modification with
risk aversion (Mirrlees [19714]) also favors the penalty mode because poten-
tial monetary losses reduce utility by more than equal monetary gains in-
crease utility.
Potential penalties must increase with the agent's perceived returns
to malfeasance to elicit honest behavior in bonding schemes. The temptation
toward malfeasance is decreasing in the extent of monitoring and detection
activity by the firm as well as in the size of the bond to be lost if mal-
feasance is detected. It follows that monitoring and the size of the bond
are inversely related in bonding schemes. But since monitoring uses real
resources (monitors must be hired and taken •out of some other productive use
of labor), whereas bonds do not, 1nonitoring resources can be driven to zero
as the bond increases without limit. The scheme is completely self-enforc-
ing in the limit. For example, penalizing double—parking offenses by execu-
tion would reduce the incidence of double—parking to miniscule proportions
and very little police time would have to be spent in ticketing offenders.
Even apart from the time—inconsistent (incredible) nature of this extreme
example, these limiting results are mainly of academic interest. For as the
bond grows in size the principal is more likely to find malfeasant behavior
when it isn't there. This type—Il error is itself a manifestation of mal-
feasance of another kind for large bonds increase the propensity for the
firm to find the employee "guilty" and seize the bond. Hence it is not
feasible to eliminate monitoring, and the optimum scheme must involve both
penalties and monitoring.16
Possibilities for malfeasance by multiple agents in joint production
require mutual monitoring and "double" bonding by all participants. This
problem has not been completely analyzed, though some interesting work has
appeared on the role of reputations in serving as bonds; and agency con-
siderations have been introduced into the analysis of trade unionism, where
the union serves as a worker's agent in dealing with the firm. An earlier
approach derives from Marshall's critique of sharecropping, where rewards
are stipulated as shares of gross revenue rather than of net profit. incen
tives by sharecroppers and landlords are misaligned because both receive
only a fraction of their social marginal product in deciding how much labor
and effort to supply to the venture. Marginal private return falls short of
marginal social return and effort is too small (Johnson [1951], Cheung
[1969]).
In a multiple sharing arrangement, the socially efficient production
outcome occurs only if the marginal share is unity for each party: each
receives full marginal product in equilibrium (Groves [1973]). Various
mechanisms have been studied to implement the efficient solution; including
"budget breaking" (Holmstrom [1982]), double—bonds (Kennan [1979]), and
trigger—strategies in repeated games (Radner [1981]), though little empiri-
cal research has studied the frequency with which any of them are observed
in practice. Since simple sharecropping systems have been historically
important in the organization of agriculture and similar institutions are
commonly observed in contingent fees for lawyers, the division of reward
among doctors (Gaynor and Pauly [1987]) and lawyers (Gilson and Mnookin
[1985]) in group practice, book royalty arrangements, rewards to actors,
musicians and so forth, the survivor principle suggests that the efficiency
losses from these schemes must have been kept at tolerable proportions. The17
simplest hypothesis is that joint monitoring and the adverse effects of
shirking on reputations and future business dealings play important roles in
resolving these conflicts of interest.
Another approach to the principal—agent problem generalizes decen-
tralized output—reward systems to include considerations of risk sharing
(Holrnstrom [1979]). The problem is set up to investigate the consequences
of hidden actions of the agent. The principal cannot observe the agent's
action, but can observe the output that is the result of these actions.
There cannot be a one—to—one correspondence between output and action or
else the principal could infer actions perfectly and the problem is trivial.
So output is a mixture of random effects and unobserved actions. If output
is large, the principal cannot tell if the agent worked very hard or was
very lucky. Similarly, a small output could have been due to bad luck
rather than shirking. The worker is risk averse and prefers certaii income
to risky income, but observability constraints make it impossible to sepa-
rate insurance from incentives. Paying a strict linear piece rate gives the
agent proper incentives to expend effort because the agent realizes the full
social product of effort, but at the cost of exposure to excessive risk.
Paying a guaranteed wage provides full insurance, but does not provide any
incentive to work.
The solution is a compromise between these two opposing forces. The
earliest treatments (Stiglitz [1975]) analyzed two—part tariff solutions,
where the principal guarantees the agent a minimum compensation for in-
surance reasons and a percentage of revenues to provide incentives to work
hard. The proportion of pay in each part depends in an obvious way on the
extent of risk, the elasticity of output with respect to effort, and the
degree of risk aversion. However, when the problem is generalized to allow18
the form of the payment schedule to be endogeneously determined, the solu-
tion is extremely complicated: payment need not even be everywhere increas-
ing in output (Grossman and Hart 11983]).
The complicated payment schedules predicted by theory is an embar-
rassment of riches and another manifestation of "too many prices:" the
schemes we observe, such as salesperson's commissions and contingency fees
in legal practice, have very few parameters. These problems would imply
complete decentralization and simple linear transfer prices were it not for
the presence of risk aversion, so there is a sense in which risk aversion
and insurance elements lead the theory astray. One can be properly skepti-
cal that risk aversion and the precise form of preferences are such an
important part of the problem. After all, a great virtue of a price system
is that it works when utility and production functions are completely pri-
vate information. Could it be that such simple schemes are observed because
they are robust to varieties of preferences? Holmstrom and Milgrom 11987]
have recently introduced intertemporal arbitrage considerations to enforce
linearity onto the optimal scheme. This is an interesting idea, but the
results still depend on special assumptions about risk aversion. None of
this theory extends in any obvious way to problems involving joint produc
tion among several agents. Furthermore, the analysis assumes that princi-
pals possess complete information about preferences of others, and is hardly
decentralized in that sense.
V. INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS
Ihave followed Coase [1937] and Aichian and Demsetz [1972] in
arguing that the expense of implementing quasi—market decentralization19
within firms forces analysis on the role of performance monitoring in under-
standing organizational structure. The interactions of personnel within
organizations are too complicated to be completely decentralized through a
price mechanism. Indeed, if this were not the case then Coase's argument
implies that the firm should not exist. This theme is consistent with
Williamson's [1975,1985] criticism of the textbook association of firms as
production functions and his idea of a governance structure. The firm's
observed production and cost functions are the outcomes of the interaction
between production technology, personnel policy,rner.t,nd stitu-
tionalrule5 and design.
Considerations of the long term goals and survival of the organiza-
tion lend additional credence to this view. Since there is substantial
earnings growth over the life cycle and since most job turnover occurs early
in the working life—cycle, a large fraction of a person's life-cycle earn-
ings is generated over the course of a career with one firm. Organizational
complexity arises from the interternporal aspects of personnel management
systems. Organization dynamics cannot be separated from internal job mobil-
ity among overlapping generations of workers and management. All organiza-
tions require specialization and division of labor among their members, but
,job assignments systematically change over a person's tenure with the firm.
Institutional memory, specific knowledge, skills and responsibilities are
constantly being transferred from old to young.
The flow and throughput of personnel through positions in the firm
can be thought of as an "internal labor market." A very good example is
provided by the officer corps in the military, where all participants begin
at a the lowest rank and either move up to higher positions of authority and
command or leave for alternative employments outside the military.Most20
organizations are more complicated than this because lateral entry and exit
accur at many points, not simply at one point. Still, mostfollow a hierar-
chical design in which ultimate control is concentrated at the top and
diffused through the ranks by horizontal and vertical linkages to middleand
lower level management and to production. In large organizations, it is
especially important to assign the most capable and energetic peopleto top
level positions because top—level decisions percolate through the organiza-
tion and have much larger effects on organizational productivity thanlower
level decisions do.
Top level decisions have multiplicative effects on productivity in
management technologies where authority is limited by a span ofcontrol and
where monitoring resources are partially economized through lengthy chains—
of—command. These multiplicative effects imply that more capable top—level
decision—making can have enormous effects on the organization and imply that
the socially efficient assignment of personnel to positions ishierarchical
in ability. The most capable people should control the most resources and
direct the largest organizations. Less capable and less energetic people
assigned to lower level positions in large firms or higher level positions
in smaller firms. The interaction of talent and scale can support extremely
large salaries for top level managers of large firms on marginal produc-
tivity grounds alone (Rosen [1982]), consistent with empirical findingsthat
top executive compensation is systematically increasing with firm size
(Murphy [198k], Kostiuk [1985]) as well as with profitability.
Monitoring, testing, and performance evaluation take on special
significance under these circumstances. Resources must be continually
devoted to designing career tracks and to grading, sorting and assigning
workers to their proper positions in the organization. Employees are not21
passive by—standers in this process because their incomes and status depend
on how they are graded. The economics of this combined design and incentive
process has begun to be analyzed in the literature on tournaments (Lazear
and Rosen [1981], in which the firm optimizes its testing, selection proce-
dures and wage structure against the competitive efforts of workers to
affect their scores, elevate their classifications and achieve higher rank-
ing positions. The ordinal quality of this kind of competition follows from
the inherent ordering properties of tests and peer comparison when direct
output measures are difficult to devise. Ordered or relative performance
evaluation also has certain optimality properties in the presence of risk
aversion: it eliminates extraneous variance due to measurement error that
is common to all participants (Holmstrom [1982], Green and Stokey [1983],
Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983]).
Sequential statistical decisions that rank and order contestants are
inherent in the intergenerational dynamics of organizations and lead to a
theory of promotions through the ranks as an important motivator of the
organization's members. Performance incentives are provided by the wage
differentials between hierarchical ranks. Top ranking prizes (wages) take
on special significance in this kind of competition, for they must rise more
than in proportion with rank to maintain performance incentives among those
competing for the highest level positions (Rosen [1986]). At early stages
of a career a person's performance incentives are propelled by a kind of
"option" value, the possibility of achieving not only the next highest
position, but all possible positions higher than that. As a successful
contestant progresses through the hierarchy and climbs higher in rank and
authority, there are fewer places left to attain. The option value falls22
with rank because there is less distance to travel. Increasing the dif-
ference in wages among the top—most ranking positions maintains incentives
by substituting for the option value that propelled performance incentives
at lower ranks. In this sense wage structures among top executive positions
reflect both the productivity of top level managers and the productivity
induced by the attempts of lower ranking employees to climb higher.
A problem inherent in performance evaluation and ability testing has
received increasing attention in the literature. Since grading, evaluation
and promotion decisions are made by higher level committees and supervisors,
contestants have incentives to increase their scores by exerting unproduc-
tive "influence" on the examiners (Milgrom [1987]). For example, in rela-
tive performance evaluations, there may be gains from unproductive activi-
ties that degrade the ranking of competitors and make a contestant look
better than others (Lazear [1986]). These adverse "gaming" incentives by
contestants apply to any evaluation system (Baker [1987], Breton and
Wintrobe [1986]) and help to understand some of the bureaucratic procedures
adopted by organizations to control them. These bureaucratic costs are
properly considered as transactions costs of nonmarket allocations within
firms and may ultimately help define the limits of the firm.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the competitive price mechanism necessary to
decentralize a complex interacting organization with indivisibilities and
joint production is very complicated. So much information and preknowledge
is required that more authoritarian "planning" mechanisms are likely to
economize on transactions costs within firms. With respect to labor re—23
sources, these allocation and contracting problems certainly involve firm—
specific human capital. However, much of this appears to arise in the
context of assembling a coherent work force and productive team within the
firm, collecting and processing information on team members' talents and
assigning them to their proper niche in the organization, and transferring
productive knowledge between older and younger members of the organization.
Incentives, testing, career assignments and rewards must be analyzed
in the context of a dynamic personnel system. Incentives and reward struc-
tures cannot be disassociated from testing, personnel assignment and labor
turnover questions in such a system. In combining all of these functions,
personnel policies are likely to be inefficient at some margins separately,
though they may achieve reasonably good compromises among all goals con-
sidered together. Looking at these systems or internal-labor-market aspects
of personnel management helps to understand some of the bureaucratic ten-
dencies in organizations as controls on members' attempts to unproductively
manipulate the system to personal advantage. Obviously much work remains to
be done in this area, but if successful it will improve our understanding of
the limits of firms and the limits of markets.214
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